Abstract-Motivated by electric vehicle charging control problems, we consider multi-agent noncooperative games where, following a data driven paradigm, unmodelled externalities acting on the players' objective functions are represented by means of scenarios. Overcoming the nondifferentiability characterizing such a setup, we retrieve a Nash equilibrium in a decentralised manner. Then, building upon recent developments in scenario-based optimization, we accompany the given solution with an a posteriori probabilistic robustness certificate, providing confidence that the computed equilibrium remains unaffected by an "unseen" uncertainty realisation. The latter constitutes, to the best of our knowledge, the first application of the so-called scenario approach to multi-agent Nash equilibrium problems. The efficacy of our approach is demonstrated in simulation for the charging coordination of an electric vehicle fleet.
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of game theory in the management and control of cyberphysical systems [1] is now consolidated, counting on a significant research effort in the last decades [2] . The significance of the Nash equilibrium (NE) in this context comes from the ability to predict the resolution of conflicts between selfish, rational agents [3] . Applications in smart grid, transportation, and IT are envisioned among the possible beneficiaries [4] - [10] .
While the cited studies address deterministic settings, in realistic scenarios the relevant information (e.g., prices in an incentive scheme) may be subject to significant uncertainty. Since the complete knowledge of the game was questioned by [11] , uncertainty has been widely addressed in noncooperative games, by adopting stochastic or robust (worstcase) approaches. In the first case, both chance-constrained (risk-averse) [12] , [13] or expected payoff criteria [14] - [18] have been considered. Due to their approach, these studies pivot around given hypotheses on the underlying probability distribution of the uncertainty. In the second case, results build upon robust control theory [3] , [19] , where assumptions on the geometry of the uncertainty set are typically imposed to ensure tractability. We refer the reader to [20] , [21] for an extended literature review.
Here we consider multi-agent NE problems with uncertainty affecting the agents' objective functions. Departing from previous robust game-theoretical literature, we follow a data-driven methodology and characterise the uncertainty by a finite set of scenarios. Specifically, we contribute to the state-of-the-art of NE problem solution algorithms in the following aspects:
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• We address the robustness of strategic equilibria in multi-agent settings, characterized as NE of noncooperative minmax games. Building upon the recent results in [22] , we extend to the realm of noncooperative games the so called scenario approach [23] -so far used solely in optimization contexts. We address the robustness performance certification for solutions of NE problems, defining an a posteriori certificate on the probability that a NE remains unaffected by a new uncertainty realization. The proposed approach does not require any additional knowledge on the uncertainty but for the available set of scenarios used in the solution computation. We note that the results of the concomitant work [24] are in a similar vein. However, differently from our method, they require uniqueness of the solution and hold for nondegenerate problems only, a condition which-unlike convex optimization programs-is hardly satisfied in games.
• We embed the above NE robustness certificate in a decentralized solution approach: relying on the action of a coordinator, no direct communication between the agents is contemplated. To circumvent the nondifferentiabilty of the game, hindering the application of conventional decentralised techniques, we follow the methodology in [25] and resort to an augmented game. Major advantages of this approach are (i) the solution computation enjoys the same convergence properties of state-of-the-art decentralized algorithms for monotone games [26] , and (ii) the uncertain component of the objective function can fall within the broader class of weakly convex functions [25] .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II we introduce a motivating example, and then provide a more general formulation of the addressed noncooperative minmax problem. We present the main result of the paper in Section III. Section IV introduces necessary ingredients for the proof, detailed in Section V. Finally, numerical results are illustrated on an electric vehicle (EV) charging coordination problem.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT A. Motivating example: coordinated EV charging
Let the set N = {1, . . . , N } designate a finite population of EV agents. The demand profile of the EVs (henceforth the strategy) x i ∈ R q + of agent i ∈ N must fulfil local constraints described by the set X i ⊂ R q . We denote by x = (x i ) i∈N ∈ X ⊂ R n , with n = qN , the collection of strategies relative to all the agents, where X = X 1 ×· · ·×X N .
Each agent determines its strategy as a response to a pricing signal received from a coordinator. Synthesized as a function of the global strategy x, such a signal can represent, for instance, the variable unit cost of a limited resource. The possible influence of uncertainty (e.g., externalities acting on the energy spot market) on the price is modelled by the parameter θ ∈ Θ. In particular, we assume that a nominal and an uncertain component-respectively p 0 (x) and p θ (x, θ)-can be distinguished. Given the availability of a finite collection of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) uncertainty realisations θ 1 , . . . , θ M ∈ Θ, we consider a scenario-based robust decision-making where each agent i ∈ N minimises
B. Noncooperative minmax game
We can write (1) in a more general form as
where f i (x) expresses local objectives as a function of local and (possibly) global strategies, whereas the second term evaluates the worst-case realization over the M -multisample {θ 1 , . . . , θ M } ⊆ Θ of some common objective g(x, θ). Thus, the solution of (2) entails a certain cooperation between the agents, which may spontaneously arise due to (partially) aligned interests (e.g., electric vehicles participating in the same aggregation plan, or belonging to a centrally managed fleet) with possible a posteriori benefit redistribution [27] . The setting described above is modelled by the nonco-
, where N is the set of players, X i , J i are respectively the strategy set and the cost function for each player i ∈ N , and Θ is the uncertainty set. We consider the following blanket assumptions:
Assumption 1: For every fixed x −i ∈ X −i and θ ∈ Θ, the function f i (·, x −i ) + g(·, x −i , θ) is convex and continuously differentiable for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, (∇ xi f i (x)) i∈N and ∇ x g(x, θ) are monotone with constant χ f and χ g , i.e.,
where χ f + χ g ≥ 0, for any u, v ∈ R n and θ ∈ Θ. Finally, the local constraint set X i is nonempty, compact and convex for all i ∈ N .
Assumption 2: The functions g and f i , for all i ∈ N , are twice differentiable on the open convex set D x satisfying X ⊂ D x ⊆ R n . We note that Assumption 1 allows either f i (·, x −i ) or g(·, θ) to be weakly convex on X i and X , respectively; indeed, χ f , χ g can take nonpositive values as long as χ f + χ g ≥ 0. We consider the following solution concept for G: Definition 3 (Nash equilibrium): Let Ω ⊆ X denote the set of Nash equilibria of G, defined as Ω x = (x i ) i∈N ∈ X :
Note that the composition of the set Ω is subject to the given multiextraction (θ 1 , . . . , θ M ) ∈ Θ M . For notational simplicity, we will not make this dependence explicit in the rest of the document.
III. SCENARIO-BASED APPROACH
A question that naturally arises is how robust a solution x * ∈ Ω is against unknown scenarios-i.e., scenarios not included in the available dataset. In the remainder of this section we show that a formal answer to this question can be provided through a sensitivity analysis of the solution over the set of samples {θ 1 , . . . , θ M } used for its derivation. Most importantly, this estimate can be performed without requiring any further knowledge of the uncertainty except for the aforementioned M samples. The main result-relying on the developments in scenario-based optimization recently presented in [22] -is a robustness certificate that quantifies the probability for a NE of the approximated game G to remain an equilibrium when a new scenario of uncertainty is realized. This result implicitly relies on the definition of a σ-algebra D on the uncertainty set Θ with assigned probability P; see, e.g., [28] and references therein.
In order to proceed we provide some basic definitions. Let Φ : Θ M → Ω be a single-valued mapping from the set of M -multisamples to the set of equilibria of G.
Definition 4 (Compression set -adapted from [22] ):
We denote by C(θ 1 , . . . , θ M ) the collection of all compression sets associated with the M -multisample {θ 1 , . . . , θ M }. We refer to the cardinality of any compression set as compression cardinality. Note that C is itself a random variable as it depends on the M -multisample.
A. A posteriori robustness certification
Recall the game G defined over M uncertainty scenarios and its NE x * singled-out through the mapping Φ. To study the sensitivity of x * to unknown scenarios, consider a new uncertainty realisation θ ∈ Θ. Then, let Ω + designate the NE set of the game
as the probability that x * is not a NE also for G + . Note this quantity is also a random variable subject to the sample multiextraction.
We can now state our main result; we defer its proof to Section V. Fix β ∈ (0, 1) and let ε : {0, . . . , M } → [0, 1] be a function satisfying [22] ε(M ) = 1,
Theorem 5: Fix β ∈ (0, 1) and let ε(·) be defined as in (6) . Under Assumptions 1, 2 the following holds:
(i) There exists a single-valued decentralized mapping Φ : Θ M → Ω from the set of feasible strategies to the set of equilibria of G;
. samples from Θ, and let |C| be the compression cardinality of any C ∈ C(θ 1 , . . . , θ M ). Then
B. Discussion
A fundamental interpretation of Theorem 5 is that it quantifies, with a given confidence level, the probability that the NE x * , computed on the randomly extracted scenarios (θ 1 , . . . , θ M ) ∈ Θ M , remains a solution of the game G when a new scenario θ ∈ Θ is produced. As a byproduct of our proof, we bound with certain confidence the probability that agents' cost deteriorates when a new realization of the uncertainty is encountered; see (16) .
We draw the attention to the a posteriori nature of the result in Theorem 5-(ii), as it requires the observation of the cardinality of any compression set associated with the obtained NE. It follows from (6) and (7) that the tightest result will correspond to the minimal compression set in C(θ 1 , . . . , θ M )-i.e., the one of smallest cardinality. An estimate of the cardinality can be achieved through different methodologies, whose design may be tuned on the specific case. A greedy algorithm of general application is described in [22, §II] . An efficient approach that exploits the structure of the considered noncooperative minmax games is presented in [29] for games showing a unique (aggregate) NE.
We also note that an a priori formulation of (7)-not requiring the observation of a compression set associated with the solution-can be obtained under non-degeneracy assumption on the problem (see [30] , [31] for a definition). For this case it is shown in [29] that an upper bound to the minimal compression cardinality can be derived as a function of the overall game's decision space dimension.
IV. DECENTRALIZED NE COMPUTATION
In this section we study in more detail the existence of a single-valued mapping Φ, necessary for the proof of Theorem 5. In particular, we consider the case in which the image of Φ corresponds to the limit of a decentralized solution algorithm for the game G. For this, we want to characterise the NE of G as solutions of a variational inequality (VI): established results in this framework provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria, and set the foundations for the design of decentralized solution procedures [26] ; proofs, omitted for space reasons, can be found in [29] , [32] . For a given domain D ⊆ R d a VI problem takes the form
The correspondence between VI solutions and NE holds true under certain assumptions by suitably defining the mapping F (·) as a pseudo-gradient of the game [33, §1.4.2] . The latter requires the game to be differentiable: however, due to the max operator, this condition is generally not satisfied by (2) .
To overcome this, we exploit a result from [25] (see Lemma 6) linking the solutions of G to those of the augmented game G between N + 1 players, defined by
for agents i ∈ N , given x −i and y = (y m ) 
Lemma 6 (Thm. 1 [25] ): Let the pair (x * , y * ) ∈ X × ∆ be a NE of the game G. Then x * is a NE of G. Note that G is a saddle problem, differentiable under Assumption 1. Hence we can define the mapping F (x, y) :
By letting z (x, y) and D X × ∆ we see that (8) represents the concatenation of the first-order optimality conditions for the N + 1 individual problems described by (9) and (10) . In the following, we refer to the problem described by (8) and (11) as VI(F, X × ∆). The link with G is formalised next.
Proposition 7: Let Assumption 1 hold, and z * = (x * , y * ) be a solution of the VI(F, X × ∆). Then (i) x * is a NE of G; (ii) The set Ω is nonempty.
A. Decentralized algorithm for monotone VI and equilibrium selection
A study of the monotonicity properties of G yields the following:
Lemma 8: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then (i) F (x, y) in (11) is monotone on X × ∆;
(ii) The game G admits multiple NEs. Lemma 8 raises a fundamental point in our discussion: due to the possibly multiple equilibria, a tie-break rule needs to be put in place to select a unique solution in the presence of multiple NEs and comply with the single-valued character of Φ as required by Theorem 5. We emphasise that despite a single solution of monotone problems is retrieved by proximal algorithms [26] , [35] , a deterministic behaviour of these cannot be ensured as the returned NE depends on the initial condition-i.e., the corresponding mapping is still multi-valued.
A tool for constructing a single-valued mapping is provided by [26, Algorithm 4] . To this aim, we reformulate the VI problem as find z * = arg min
where the minimum-norm equilibrium of the game G is specified as the unique solution.
The fixed point of Algorithm 1 is the NE of G satisfying (12)-hence a NE of G-by considering the regularized game G τ,z where τ andz = (x,ȳ) are the designated step size and centre of regularization, respectively. This is formalised as follows.
Lemma 9: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold; let F be defined as in (11), and η ≥ 0 given. Then, for any τ > 0 and z ∈ X × ∆, the regularized game G τ,z defined by steps 6 and 8 in Algorithm 1 has a unique NE.
Lemma 10: Let {η (k) } ∞ k=0 be any sequence satisfying
and lim k→∞ η (k) = 0; pick τ ≥τ > 0, whereτ is such that steps 3-11 of Algorithm 1 are a block contraction [36] ; let {z
denote the sequence generated by the Algorithm. Under assumptions 1 and 2, there exists γ inn , γ out > 0 such that
is bounded, and
is the solution of (12). Moreover, there exists x ∈ Ω such that x = x * .
Algorithm 1 Proximal decomposition algorithm
Require:
l ← 0 for i = 1, . . . , N do 6:
end for 8:
12:
A proof for the existence of a single-valued mapping Φ is provided by the construction of Section IV-A. In this regard, we emphasize that Assumptions 1-2 are tailored to our interest in a multi-agent setting: they may be relaxed in case Φ corresponds to a centralized algorithm.
(ii): Let x * = Φ(θ 1 , . . . , θ M ) ∈ Ω, with (θ 1 , . . . , θ M ) ∈ Θ M , and let |C| be the cardinality of any compression set C ∈ C(θ 1 , . . . , θ M ). Let γ * = max m∈{1,...,M } g(x * , θ m ). For any θ ∈ Θ, let H θ = {(x, γ) : g(x, θ) ≤ γ}. Fix β ∈ (0, 1) and define ε(·) as in (6) . From [22, Thm. 1] we have
if the following consistency condition holds for H θ [37] (x * , γ * ) ∈ H θm , ∀m ∈ {1, . . . , M }.
We observe that by Definition 3, for each i ∈ N , (x * i , γ * ) belongs to the set of minimizers of the following epigraphic reformulation of the optimization program in (4) (14), (13) is established. Note that for [22, Thm. 1] to be invoked, (15) is not required to be a convex optimization program; this is in conformity with Assumption 1. By definition of γ * and H θ , (13) implies
with confidence at least 1 − β. We now proceed to demonstrate the claim in (7) . Recall that by Proposition 7 we can obtain x * ∈ Ω as solution of (12). By substituting (11) into the latter, by definition ofĝ in (9) , and recalling
where (x * , y * ) is a NE of G. For a given θ ∈ Θ, recall from Section III-A the definition of the game G + associated with the samples {θ 1 , . . . , θ M } ∪ {θ}, and the associated set of NE Ω + . Moreover, let G + denote the associated augmented game. Similarly to (17b), any solution (
Note the analogy between (18) and (17b), with extra terms corresponding to the additional scenario θ (y M +1 is the associated decision variable).
To quantify the probability of x * ∈ Ω + , we observe that if g(x * , θ) ≤ γ * , then x + = x * and y + = (y * , 0) constitute a feasible pair for (18) . This is due to the fact that under this choice y
reducing (18) 
By (16) and (19), (7) follows, thus concluding the proof.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE: COORDINATED EV CHARGING PROBLEM REVISITED In the following, the strategy vector x i of each EV describes the charging demand over q = T time slots, considered to be of unit length (1 h). We suppose that the energy price in (1) is well approximated by an affine function of the aggregate strategy σ(x) : x → i∈N x i . Accordingly, p 0 (x) = A 0 σ(x)+b 0 , and p θ (x, θ m ) = A m σ(x)+b m , where A m ∈ R T ×T , for m = 0, . . . , M , are diagonal matrices, and b m ∈ R T ; historical price data can be combined with standard scenario generation techniques [38] to generate the set
characterizing the uncertain price component p θ . We assume the charging operations are subject to
, where E i , P i ∈ R respectively designate the desired final state of charge (SoC) and the maximum power deliverable by the charger.
We analyse the results of several randomly generated cases, differing in the parameters characterizing the EV constraints X i , selected from a uniform random distribution: specifically, P i ∈ [6, 15] 4, 6] ; the setting considered in this example can be cast into an iterative QP optimization, which was efficiently solved on a dual-core 7th gen. Intel processor using Matlab. Table I shows the mean robustness performance of several solutions (with N = 20, T = 24), obtained from different sets of M = 500 samples, grouped by the observed compression cardinality (using the method in [29] ), denoted asd. The empirical violation rates V (x * ) were recorded over 10 6 newly extracted samples (according to the same aforementioned distributions), while the ones provided by Theorem 5 are obtained by setting β = 10 −6 . Consistently with [22] , we observe thatd is indicative of the confidence level on the equilibrium robustness. In this case, the conservativeness of the theoretical bound can be addressed to the relatively small number of samples (500) employed for In this cased = 2, with C = {θ 53 , θ 282 } supporting the solution together with the SoC constraint which is binding in this case. This is shown by the plane in transparent blue, representing all aggregate strategies fulfilling σ(x)| t=1 + σ(x)| t=2 = i∈N E i over the considered time interval. Constraints on the power rate P i are not active, and omitted for clarity. the computation of the NE. We observe that a much tighter bound on the violation probability (∼2-3%) can be achieved in the same case by increasing the sample size to M = 2000.
A visual representation of the concept of support constraint is given in Fig. 1 . The plot depicts the curves expressing the uncertain cost term N g(x * , θ m ) associated to a subset m ∈ {53, 72, 282, 566} of the M = 1000 samples used in this case for the derivation of the NE x * . Values are plotted as a function of the aggregate demand (σ(x)| t=1 , σ(x)| t=2 ) on an interval around σ(x * ). The (minimal) compression set C = {θ 53 , θ 282 } supports the solution together with the constraint on the target SoC. This is shown by the plane in transparent blue, representing all possible values of the aggregate strategies satisfying i∈N E i over the considered time interval. Note that in this case the constraints on the power rate P i are not active, and omitted from the plot for clarity.
We observed over several trials that this setting reveals some structure with respect to the considered uncertainty. In particular, a specific relation betweend and the dimension of the individual decision variable T holds in place. As shown in Fig. 2 , experimental results suggest that the minimal compression cardinality is upper-bounded by T . Interestingly, at the same time we observed no sensitivity to the variation of the number of agents N .
VII. CONCLUSION
We considered multi-agent Nash equilibrium problems in the presence of uncertainty, modelled as noncooperative minmax games. We proposed a data driven solution paradigm where uncertainty is represented by means of scenarios. We showed how a NE can be accompanied with a robust sensitivity certificate, providing confidence on the probability that the computed solution remains unaffected by an "unseen" uncertainty realisation. The approach was demonstrated on a charging coordination problem of a fleet of electric vehicles. Current work focuses on refining the obtained bound by exploiting the support rank concept [40] . We will also investigate the possibility of using the readily available shadow prices associated to the support samples as a tuning parameter to achieve the desired tradeoff between robustness and performance [30] , [41] .
